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INTRODUCTION 
In the fall of 1980, after pleading guilty to burglary and theft by sto-
len property, Danny Bearden was sentenced to three years’ probation and 
ordered to pay $750 in fines and restitution: $200 within two days and the 
remaining balance within four months.1 Mr. Bearden borrowed money 
from his parents to make the first payment, but a month later, was laid off 
from his job and could not find other work.2 Shortly before the remaining 
balance was due, he was forced to notify his probation officer that he 
would be late with his payment.3 In response, the trial court revoked his 
probation, and Mr. Bearden was ordered to serve the remainder of his 
probationary period in prison.4 Two years later, the Supreme Court set 
him free, holding that where a person on probation makes bona fide ef-
forts to pay the fines they owe but is unable to do so through no fault of 
their own, it is “fundamentally unfair” to imprison them based on their 
poverty.5 The Court thus affirmed the unconstitutionality of debtors’ pris-
ons,6 which had been abolished by federal law in 1833, 150 years earlier, 
as well as by a number of states shortly thereafter.7 
The Supreme Court’s ruling has seemingly gone unheard: the prac-
tice of incarcerating people for their inability to pay endures.8 Today, lo-
cal courts continue to send people bills for unpaid debts that they incur 
merely by being arrested—and then sentence them to jail when they can-
not afford to pay the ever-increasing fines and fees that are associated 
with the criminal legal system.9 For instance, in 2014, every state except 
 
 1 Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 662 (1983). 
 2 Id. at 662-63. 
 3 Id. at 663. 
 4 Id. 
 5 Id. at 667-69. 
 6 This Note refers to debtors’ prisons (the historical practice of incarcerating people for 
private, contractual debts) and debtors’ prison schemes and practices such as fines and fees 
(the modern practice of charging people who enter the criminal legal system fines and fees 
and then incarcerating them for failing to pay) interchangeably. 
 7 Eli Hager, Debtors’ Prisons, Then and Now: FAQ, MARSHALL PROJECT (Feb. 24, 2015, 
7:15 AM), https://perma.cc/U4UH-VS7M. For an in-depth, historical overview of debtors’ 
prison practices in the United States, see Jill Lepore, I.O.U., How We Used to Treat Debtors, 
NEW YORKER (Apr. 6, 2009), https://perma.cc/PE9Z-J6Q9. 
 8 See Olivia C. Jerjian, The Debtors’ Prison Scheme: Yet Another Bar in the Birdcage of 
Mass Incarceration of Communities of Color, 41 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 235, 242-
45 (2017) (discussing the evolution of debtors’ prisons, including the practice of “leasing” 
Black men convicted of misdemeanors to private companies to pay off their debt, as well as 
the skyrocketing fines and fees that modern courts charge). 
 9 See, e.g., Hager, supra note 7; Jessica Pishko, Locked Up for Being Poor, ATLANTIC 
(Feb. 25, 2015), https://perma.cc/KPN4-J8PG; Tina Rosenberg, Out of Debtors’ Prison, with 
Law as the Key, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 27, 2015, 7:00 AM), https://perma.cc/XES9-99VX; Joseph 
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for Hawaii charged people for electronic monitoring devices, which they 
wear only because they are ordered to do so.10 There are countless stories 
of people being sent to jail for failing to pay private probation fees,11 med-
ical debt,12 credit card debt,13 or for failing to appear in court to pay off 
traffic violations that they cannot afford.14 Many of the fines and fees that 
municipal courts charge are driven by city revenue goals.15 
Advocates challenging these contemporary debtors’ prison practices 
in federal court have found some success, but municipalities unwilling to 
dam their revenue streams are now arguing that municipal courts cannot 
be sued because they are arms of the state and are thus immune from suit 
under the Eleventh Amendment. Whether municipal courts should re-
ceive Eleventh Amendment protection is an open question made all the 
more complex by the Eleventh Amendment and arm-of-the-state doc-
trine’s muddled history and the circuits’ disparate attempts at applying 
what limited Supreme Court precedent is available. 
This Note argues that the rise of litigation against debtors’ prisons 
calls for renewed attention to the arm-of-the-state test’s consistency with 
the Eleventh Amendment’s original purpose, and that, because of their 
local funding and control, municipal courts should not receive sovereign 
immunity. Part I discusses municipalities’ contemporary use of debtors’ 
prisons practices like fines and fees to generate revenue, how litigants 
have challenged those fines and fees, and how municipalities are contest-
ing their responsibility. Part II examines the Eleventh Amendment’s ori-
gins and purpose, which are the foundation for the arm-of-the-state doc-
trine. Part III lays out the Supreme Court’s articulation of the arm-of-the-
state doctrine and the circuits’ incoherent attempts to craft their own arm-
of-the-state tests. Finally, Part IV suggests first that, specifically in the 
Shapiro, As Court Fees Rise, the Poor Are Paying the Price, NPR (May 19, 2014, 4:02 PM), 
https://perma.cc/VG2R-JX4Z. 
 10 Shapiro, supra note 9. In 2018, the non-profit Equal Justice Under Law filed a class-
action suit against a private company which provides electronic monitoring services to multi-
ple jurisdictions in California, alleging that the company extorts fees from poor people through 
threat of incarceration. Complaint at 2, Edwards v. Leaders in Cmty. Alternatives, Inc., No. 
4:18-cv-04609, 2018 WL 6591449 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 14, 2018), https://perma.cc/5LWM-
DWEU. 
 11 Hannah Rappleye & Lisa Riordan Seville, The Town That Turned Poverty into a Prison 
Sentence, NATION (Mar. 14, 2014), https://perma.cc/XNQ9-PVL5. 
 12 Susie An, Unpaid Bills Land Some Debtors Behind Bars, NPR (Dec. 12, 2011, 12:01 
AM), https://perma.cc/G6EQ-524A. 
 13 Chris Serres & Glenn Howatt, In Jail for Being in Debt, STAR TRIBUNE (Mar. 17, 2011, 
4:40 PM), https://perma.cc/LS4F-ZHAC. 
 14 Radley Balko, How Municipalities in St. Louis County, Mo., Profit from Poverty, 
WASH. POST (Sept. 3, 2014, 1:30 PM), https://perma.cc/9SM8-YMZ4. 
 15 See Hager, supra note 7; ACLU, IN FOR A PENNY: THE RISE OF AMERICA’S NEW
DEBTORS’ PRISONS 8-9 (2010), https://perma.cc/4Z2B-SHP8. 
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context of debtors’ prison litigation, municipal courts should not receive 
sovereign immunity, and second that, in order to realign the arm-of-the-
state doctrine with the Eleventh Amendment’s purpose as described by 
the Supreme Court, further consideration must be given to focusing the 
arm-of-the-state test on funding and local control. 
I. LITIGATION AGAINST MODERN-DAY DEBTORS’ PRISONS AND 
MUNICIPAL PUSHBACK 
A. Debtors’ Prisons as Revenue Sources 
As both commentators and court administrators themselves have 
noted, the resurgence of debtors’ prisons is closely linked to shrinking 
municipal budgets and the recent financial crisis.16 In 2003, the Confer-
ence of State Court Administrators (“COSCA”) warned that “state gov-
ernments today are experiencing the worst fiscal crisis in many decades,” 
and that “deep budget cuts . . . are forcing court closures.”17 While 
COSCA emphasized that state legislatures should fund state courts, it 
noted that, “[i]n a tight budget environment, increasing fees and fines . . . 
may be a viable option” and that “enhanced collection of uncollected 
fines” would generate revenue.18 In 2012, COSCA released a follow-up 
policy paper, aptly titled Courts Are Not Revenue Centers, cautioning its 
members that courts should “not impose unreasonable financial obliga-
tions assessed to fund other governmental services” and should “strive for 
a revenue structure that provides access, adequacy, stability, equity, trans-
parency and simplicity”—an implicit rebuke of COSCA’s earlier posi-
tion.19 Four years later, COSCA released yet another policy paper, this 
 
 16 Eric Balaban, Shining a Light into Dark Corners: A Practitioner’s Guide to Successful 
Advocacy to Curb Debtor’s Prisons, 15 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 275, 276 (2014); Alexes Harris et 
al., Drawing Blood from Stones: Legal Debt and Social Inequality in the Contemporary United 
States, 115 AM. J. SOCIOLOGY 1753, 1793 n.30 (2010); Jerjian, supra note 8, at 248; Torie 
Atkinson, Note, A Fine Scheme: How Municipal Fines Become Crushing Debt in the Shadow 
of the New Debtors’ Prisons, 51 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 190, 195-96 (2016). 
 17 CONFERENCE OF STATE COURT ADMINISTRATORS, POSITION PAPER ON STATE JUDICIAL 
BRANCH BUDGETS IN TIMES OF FISCAL CRISIS 2 (2003), https://perma.cc/E27L-JQ98. COSCA 
is an organization consisting of all fifty states’ state court administrators that advocates for the 
improvement of state court systems. 
 18 Id. at 13-14. 
 19 CARL REYNOLDS & JEFF HALL, CONFERENCE OF STATE COURT ADMINISTRATORS, 
COURTS ARE NOT REVENUE CENTERS 1, 13 (2012), https://perma.cc/A66V-N377. 
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time calling for courts to put an end to practices that encourage incarcer-
ation based on failure to pay fines and fees.20 COSCA has framed its pol-
icy papers as part of the organization’s supposedly long-standing com-
mitment to reducing or eliminating court funding through fees,21 but 
COSCA called for just the opposite in 2003 when it suggested that in-
creasing court fines and fees was a viable option for generating municipal 
revenue.22 It is no wonder that cities and counties concerned about finding 
revenue streams to shore up their budgets have aggressively charged and 
collected fines and fees, pulling people into the criminal legal system to 
bolster municipal bottom lines.23 
The city of Ferguson, Missouri, illustrates this phenomenon all too 
well.24 In its 2015 report on the investigation of the Ferguson Police De-
partment, the United States Department of Justice described the city’s 
municipal courts’ priority as “maximizing revenue,”25 not the “fair ad-
ministration of justice.”26 Ferguson “[c]ity, police, and court officials . . . 
worked in concert to maximize revenue at every stage of the enforcement 
process.”27 In fact, Ferguson city officials lauded then-Municipal Judge 
Brockmeyer for creating fees that the Department of Justice’s report de-
scribed as “abusive.”28 Correspondence between the Ferguson Court 
Clerk and Judge Brockmeyer emphasized the importance of meeting the 
court’s targets for fine and fee collection.29 Defendants who could not pay 
the fines and fees set by the Ferguson court were jailed.30 
Unfortunately, Ferguson is not alone: in 2012, thirty-eight American 
cities received ten percent or more of their revenue from fines and fees, 
 20 See ARTHUR W. PEPIN, CONFERENCE OF STATE COURT ADMINISTRATORS, THE END OF
DEBTORS’ PRISONS: EFFECTIVE COURT POLICIES FOR SUCCESSFUL COMPLIANCE WITH LEGAL 
FINANCIAL OBLIGATIONS (2016), https://perma.cc/JZL8-FGP2. 
21 Id. at 2. 
22 CONFERENCE OF STATE COURT ADMINISTRATORS, supra note 17, at 13-14. 
23 Hager, supra note 7; ACLU, supra note 15, at 8-9. 
24 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON
POLICE DEPARTMENT 9-15 (2015) [hereinafter “FERGUSON REPORT”], https://perma.cc/PPH4-
EXY8 (describing Ferguson city officials’ and police officers’ revenue-driven practices). 
25 Id. at 9. 
26 Id. at 15. 
27 Id. at 10. 
28 Id. at 14. These fines and fees included a $50 fee for every time a person had a pending 
municipal arrest warrant cleared and a fine for failure to appear that increased every time the 
defendant failed to appear or pay the fine. 
29 FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 24, at 14-15. 
 30 First Amended Class Action Complaint at 1, Fant v. City of Ferguson, No. 4:15-cv-
00253-AGF (E.D. Mo. Apr. 13, 2016), https://perma.cc/TK5G-PZPD. 
118 CUNY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:113 
and many more received at least five percent.31 More recently, in response 
to multiple local judges setting fines to generate revenue for their munic-
ipalities, the New Jersey Supreme Court issued a memorandum to all mu-
nicipal judges emphasizing that “[t]he imposition of punishment should 
in no way be linked to a town’s need for revenue.”32 Municipal courts 
across the country have thus revived debtors’ prisons practices through 
the use of fines and fees, effectively incarcerating people because they are 
poor.33 
B. Legal Challenges to Debtors’ Prisons Schemes Face Municipal 
Pushback 
In the past decade, class action lawsuits have emerged as an effective 
strategy for civil rights organizations and advocates to challenge munici-
palities and counties’ practice of using court- or law enforcement-im-
posed fines and fees to generate revenue, and incarcerating people who 
cannot pay those fines and fees. The National Center for State Courts, 
founded at Chief Justice Burger’s urging in order to provide authoritative 
information on local courts,34 reports fifty-two cases filed in state and 
federal court between 2012 and 2018 challenging fines and fees.35 Organ-
izations such as Equal Justice Under Law, the Southern Center for Human 
Rights, the Southern Poverty Law Center, and the American Civil Liber-
ties Union have filed suits alleging modern-day debtors’ prison schemes 
 
 31 U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, TARGETED FINES AND FEES AGAINST COMMUNITIES OF 
COLOR 20-22 (2017) (citing Dan Kopf, The Fining of Black America, PRICEONOMICS (June 24, 
2016), https://perma.cc/T28M-5ZH2), https://perma.cc/DA2V-AD29. 
 32 Memorandum on Fines and Penalties in Municipal Court from Stuart Rabner, Chief 
Justice of the New Jersey Supreme Court, to All Judges of the Municipal and Superior Courts 
(Apr. 17, 2018), https://perma.cc/2P5G-QCN6. 
 33 See, e.g., Atkinson, supra note 16, at 194-98 (2016); Mollie Bryant & Jerry Mitchell, 
Lawsuit: Jackson Runs What Amounts to Debtors’ Prison, CLARION-LEDGER (Oct. 13, 2015), 
https://perma.cc/2Q3L-YM9Z; Nicholas K. Geranios & Gene Johnson, ACLU Lawsuit: Ben-
ton County Jailing People Who Can’t Pay Court Fines, SEATTLE TIMES (Oct. 6, 2015, 5:12 
PM), https://perma.cc/UHS7-5SXW; Lucas Sullivan & Dylan Tussel, Convicts Entering 
Franklin County Jail Must Pay $40, COLUMBUS DISPATCH (Nov. 30, 2011, 10:38 AM), 
https://perma.cc/8KCR-FJEY; Tanzina Vega, Biloxi Accused of Running “Modern-Day Debt-
ors’ Prison.,” CNN MONEY (Oct. 21, 2015, 2:05 PM), https://perma.cc/JVU2-G59A. 
 34 About Us, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, https://perma.cc/NTT3-FARL (last visited 
May 10, 2019). 
 35 States That Have Recent Litigation Related to Fines, Fees, or Bail Practices, NAT’L 
CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, https://perma.cc/PVY9-CRD4 (last visited May 10, 2019). 
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against cities in Alabama,36 Arkansas,37 Georgia,38 Louisiana,39 Missis-
sippi,40 Missouri,41 South Carolina,42 and Texas,43 among others. Civil 
rights advocates have targeted multiple cities in Missouri specifically: in 
2015, ArchCity Defenders44 filed twin class action suits against the cities 
of Jennings and Ferguson, alleging that both cities had maintained brazen 
debtors’ prison schemes for years with the express purpose of generating 
36 See First Amended Class Action Complaint, Mitchell v. City of Montgomery, No. 2:14-
cv-186-MEF (M.D. Ala. May 23, 2014).
37 See Complaint – Class Action, Dade v. City of Sherwood, No. 4:16-cv-00602-JM (E.D. 
Ark. Aug. 23, 2016), https://perma.cc/C96L-3L52. The parties reached a settlement in 2017. 
See Stipulation Regarding Settlement, Dade v. City of Sherwood, No. 4:16-cv-00602-JM 
(E.D. Ark. Nov. 14, 2017), https://perma.cc/Y8LU-HFN4. 
 38 Complaint at 1-2, Jones v. Grady Cty., No. 1:13-cv-00156-WLS (M.D. Ga. Sept. 24, 
2013). The District Court ultimately approved a settlement agreement. See Order Granting 
Final Approval of Class Action Settlement at 9, 14, Jones v. Grady Cty., No. 1:13-cv-00156-
WLS (M.D. Ga. Oct. 14, 2015). See also Plaintiffs’ Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive 
Relief, Brucker v. City of Doraville, No. 1:18-cv-02375-RWS (N.D. Ga. May 23, 2018). 
39 See First Amended Class Action Complaint, Cain v. City of New Orleans, No. 2:15-
cv-4479-SSV-JCW (E.D. La. Sept. 21, 2015).
40 See Class Action Complaint, Bell v. City of Jackson, No. 3:15-cv-00732-TSL-RHW
(S.D. Miss. Oct. 9, 2015); Class Action Complaint, Kennedy v. City of Biloxi, No. 1:15-cv-
348 (S.D. Miss. Oct. 21, 2015). 
 41 See Civil Rights Class Action Complaint, Whitner v. City of Pagedale, No. 4:15-cv-
01655-RWS (E.D. Mo. Nov. 4, 2015). In 2018, the presiding judge approved a consent decree 
providing for steps to reform Pagedale’s municipal court practices and city prosecutions. See 
Consent Decree, Whitner v. City of Pagedale, No. 4:15-cv-01655-RWS (E.D. Mo. May 21, 
2018). 
 42 See Class Action Second Amended Complaint, Brown v. Lexington Cty., No. 3:17-cv-
1426-MBS-SVH (D.S.C. Oct. 19, 2017). 
 43 See Class Action Complaint, West v. City of Santa Fe, No. 3:16-cv-00309 (S.D. Tex. 
Nov. 3, 2016). 
 44 ArchCity Defenders is a nonprofit civil rights law firm based in St. Louis, Missouri, 
dedicated to combating the criminalization of poverty and state violence against poor people 
and people of color. Who We Are, ARCHCITY DEFENDERS, https://perma.cc/ZWE9-F3VL (last 
visited Dec. 27, 2019). Since its founding in 2009, the firm has filed numerous actions against 
municipalities in the St. Louis area challenging police misconduct, debtors’ prisons, cash bail, 
and inhumane jail conditions, among other issues. Civil Rights Litigation, ARCHCITY
DEFENDERS, https://perma.cc/247M-LL3V (last visited Dec. 27, 2019). 
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revenue.45 ArchCity Defenders went on to file similar suits against the 
cities of St. Ann,46 Maplewood,47 and Florissant.48 
While some debtors’ prison class actions have ended in settlements 
or consent degrees,49 a number of municipalities have objected to being 
held liable for their courts’ actions. The city of Ferguson moved to dis-
miss ArchCity Defenders’ suit in 201650 and again in 2017,51 claiming in 
both motions that the Ferguson municipal court is immune from suit un-
der the Eleventh Amendment.52 Both motions were denied,53 but Fergu-
son moved so again in 2019, insisting that the city has no control over the 
municipal court, that the municipal court is part of Missouri’s state circuit 
court system, and that the municipal court is thus entitled to sovereign 
immunity.54 The city of Maplewood also moved to dismiss ArchCity De-
fenders’ suit, arguing that the Maplewood Municipal Court is an arm of 
the state and thus protected from suit by the Eleventh Amendment.55 The 
 
 45 Class Action Complaint at 1, 36, Jenkins v. City of Jennings, No. 4:15-cv-00252-CEJ 
(E.D. Mo. Feb. 8, 2015); Class Action Complaint at 33-34, Fant v. Ferguson, No. 4:15-cv-
00253-SPM (E.D. Mo. Feb. 8, 2015). The city of Jennings settled in late 2016, agreeing to 
compensate people who were incarcerated for failing to pay fines and fees. See Order Granting 
Final Approval of Class Action Settlement, Jenkins v. Jennings, No. 4:15-cv-00252-CEJ (E.D. 
Mo. Dec. 14, 2016). 
 46 See Second Amended Class Action Complaint, Thomas v. City of St. Ann, No. 4:16-
cv-01302-RWS (E.D. Mo. July 21, 2017). 
 47 See Class Action Complaint, Webb v. City of Maplewood, No. 4:16-cv-01703 (E.D. 
Mo. Nov. 1, 2016). 
 48 See Class Action Complaint, Baker v. City of Florissant, No. 4:16-cv-01693 (E.D. Mo. 
Oct. 31, 2016). 
 49 See supra notes 37-38, 41, 45. 
 50 See Defendant’s Motion to Partially Dismiss Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint, Fant 
v. City of Ferguson, No. 4:15-cv-00253-AGF (E.D. Mo. Apr. 27, 2016). 
 51 See Defendant City of Ferguson’s Corrected Motion to Dismiss Counts I Through III 
and V Through VII for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction, Fant v. City of Ferguson, No. 
4:15-cv-00253-AGF (E.D. Mo. Sept. 20, 2017). 
 52 Defendant’s Memorandum in Support of Its Motion to Partially Dismiss Plaintiffs’ 
First Amended Complaint, Fant v. City of Ferguson, No. 4:15-cv-00253-AGF (E.D. Mo. Apr. 
27, 2016); Memorandum in Support of Defendant the City of Ferguson’s Corrected Motion to 
Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction at 12-17, Fant v. City of Ferguson, No. 4:15-
cv-00253-AGF (E.D. Mo. Sept. 20, 2017). 
 53 See Fant v. City of Ferguson, No. 4:15-cv-00253-AGF, 2016 WL 6696065 (E.D. Mo. 
Nov. 15, 2016); Fant v. City of Ferguson, No. 4:15-cv-00253-AGF, 2018 BL 48196 (E.D. Mo. 
Feb. 13, 2018) (denying Ferguson’s 2016 and 2017 motions to dismiss, respectively). 
 54 The City of Ferguson’s Memorandum in Support of Its Motion to Dismiss Counts I 
Through III and V Through VII for Failure to Join an Indispensable Party at 2, 25, Fant v. City 
of Ferguson, No. 4:15-cv-00253-AGF (E.D. Mo. Mar. 5, 2019). 
 55 Defendant’s Memorandum in Support of Its Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Class Action 
Complaint for Failure to State a Cause of Action at 13, Webb v. City of Maplewood, No. 4:16-
cv-01703-CDP (E.D. Mo. Dec. 29, 2016). 
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District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri denied the city’s mo-
tion56 and the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals denied the city’s interloc-
utory appeal, holding that the city of Maplewood can be held liable for 
unconstitutional policies or customs even if all individual officials partic-
ipating in those policies are immune from suit.57 St. Ann moved to dis-
miss on identical grounds, arguing that the “alleged wrongs against [the 
plaintiffs] relate back, not to St. Ann, but to the municipal court division 
in St. Ann, an arm-of-the-state and the real party in interest” which is 
protected by Eleventh Amendment immunity.58 
To date, cities’ attempts to sidestep liability for their debtors’ prisons 
by claiming that the local court is an arm of the state and distinct from the 
city itself have not succeeded,59 but advocates who seek to challenge debt-
ors’ prisons schemes by suing the cities and courts perpetrating them face 
an open question: whether municipal courts are arms of the state protected 
from suit by the Eleventh Amendment.60 The arm-of-the-state doctrine’s 
muddled articulation offers little help in discerning an answer. 
II. THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT’S MURKY ORIGINS AND LIMITATIONS
A. The Amendment’s Purpose
An overview of the Eleventh Amendment’s purpose is helpful in un-
derstanding the origins and disarray of the arm-of-the-state doctrine. 
However, such discussion must begin with the acknowledgement that 
“step[ping] through the looking glass of the Eleventh Amendment leads 
 56 Webb v. City of Maplewood, No. 4:16-cv-1703, 2017 WL 2418011 (E.D. Mo. June 5, 
2017). 
57 Webb v. City of Maplewood, 889 F.3d 483, 487-88 (8th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 
S. Ct. 389 (2018). The circuit court noted that, even if the municipal court is a separate and
distinct entity over which the city has no control, “the City will have a defense on the merits
but not immunity from suit.” Id. at 486.
58 Memorandum in Support of Defendant the City of St. Ann’s Motion to Dismiss for 
Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction at 5, Thomas v. City of St. Ann, No. 4:16-cv-01302-RWS 
(E.D. Mo. Sept. 8, 2017). The court denied the motion, rejecting St. Ann’s argument that it is 
immune from suit even if all of the individuals identified as participants in the contested prac-
tices are immune from suit. Order at 2, Thomas v. City of St. Ann, No. 4:16-cv-01302-RWS 
(E.D. Mo. Sept. 14, 2018). 
59 See supra notes 53, 57-58. 
60 Balaban, supra note 16, at 280-81. 
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to a wonderland of judicially created and perpetuated fiction and para-
dox.”61 Ratified in response62 to Chisholm v. Georgia,63 the Amend-
ment’s explicitly stated function is to prevent federal courts from hearing 
suits against a state brought by citizens of another state or a foreign state.64 
However, despite the Amendment’s concise language,65 the Supreme 
Court has expanded its meaning to protect states from being sued by their 
own citizens,66 by foreign states,67 and by Native tribes.68 “As so con-
strued, the Amendment is in substantial tension with the rule-of-law ax-
iom that for every federal right there must be a remedy enforceable in the 
federal court: [people] . . . cannot enforce their federal rights in federal 
court suits against the states.”69 The modern conception of state sovereign 
immunity thus is a “hodgepodge of confusing and intellectually 
indefensible” judicially developed and maintained creation.70 
Many have written on71—and debated—the underlying purpose and 
scope of the Eleventh Amendment and of state sovereign immunity. One 
61 Spicer v. Hilton, 618 F.2d 232, 235 (3d Cir. 1980). 
 62 Id.; see also Martha A. Field, The Eleventh Amendment and Other Sovereign Immunity 
Doctrines: Part One, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 515, 515 (1978) (“The one interpretation of the elev-
enth amendment to which everyone subscribes is that it was intended to overturn Chisholm v. 
Georgia.”). 
63 See Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793) (entering a default judgment 
against the state of Georgia in a suit by citizens of South Carolina to recover on confiscated 
bonds). 
64 U.S. CONST. amend. XI. 
 65 The Eleventh Amendment states in its entirety that “[t]he Judicial power of the United 
States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted 
against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any 
Foreign State.” U.S. CONST. amend. XI. 
66 Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10-11, 15 (1890) (holding that a citizen of a state may 
not sue that state in federal court on a claim arising under federal law unless the state consents). 
67 See Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 330 (1934). 
68 See Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatack, 501 U.S. 775, 779-82 (1991). 
69 Carlos Manuel Vásquez, What is Eleventh Amendment Immunity?, 106 YALE L.J. 1683, 
1686 (1997). 
 70 John J. Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity: A Reinter-
pretation, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1889, 1891 (1983). 
 71 See, e.g., Gibbons, supra note 70, at 1892 (placing the Amendment in its historical 
context to argue that the Amendment is limited to preventing “the judicial power of the United 
States [from] extend[ing] to an action against a state if the only basis for federal jurisdiction 
is the presence of a diverse or alien party.”); Vicki C. Jackson, Principle and Compromise in 
Constitutional Adjudication: The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity, 75 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 953, 974 (2000) (questioning the assumption that nineteenth century 
remedies define what the Constitution requires and prohibits of remedies against states); John 
E. Nowak, The Scope of Congressional Power to Create Causes of Action Against State Gov-
ernments and the History of the Eleventh and Fourteenth Amendments, 75 COLUM. L. REV.
1413, 1422 (1975) (describing the connection between Article III and the Eleventh Amend-
ment as defining the scope of federal court jurisdiction).
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predominant theory is that, in deciding Chisholm v. Georgia,72 the Su-
preme Court abandoned the Constitution’s Framers’ intent that states be 
immune from private suit, and that the Amendment was enacted in order 
to restore that original understanding.73 The Supreme Court endorsed this 
notion, noting that “[b]ehind the words of the constitutional provisions 
are postulates which limit and control. There is . . . the postulate that 
States of the Union, still possessing attributes of sovereignty, shall be im-
mune from suits, without their consent, save where there has been ‘a sur-
render of this immunity in the plan of the convention.’”74 
Two centuries of “tortured reading” of the Eleventh Amendment75 
led to the Supreme Court’s articulation of two entwined rationales for 
state sovereign immunity: the protection of state sovereignty from the of-
fense of a state’s being haled into court against its will, and the insulation 
of the state treasury from the judgments of federal courts.76 Commenta-
tors have argued that state sovereign immunity serves a number of addi-
tional interests—allowing government to operate more efficiently,77 re-
stricting the federal government’s ability to create liabilities that bind 
state governments,78 and protecting the policy decisions of popularly-
elected officials79—all of which reflect the Supreme Court’s focus on fed-
eralism in developing Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence.80 
B. Bypassing Eleventh Amendment Immunity by Suing Local Entities
Over the past century, the Supreme Court has carved out caveats to
the broad protections that Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity of-
fers to states. There are three major exceptions: Congressional abrogation 
72 Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793). 
 73 Field, supra note 62, at 515. See also Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 325 (1934); 
Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 12 (1890); Alan D. Cullison, Interpretation of the Eleventh 
Amendment (A Case of the White Knight’s Green Whiskers), 5 HOUS. L. REV. 1, 7, 9 (1967). 
74 Monaco, 292 U.S. at 322–23 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 81 (Alexander Hamilton)). 
75 DONALD L. DOERNBERG, SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY OR THE RULE OF LAW: THE NEW
FEDERALISM’S CHOICE 148 (2005). 
 76 Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 760 (2002); Hess v. Port 
Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 47-48 (1994); Alex E. Rogers, Clothing State Gov-
ernmental Entities with Sovereign Immunity: Disarray in the Eleventh Amendment Arm-of-
the-State Doctrine, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1243, 1245 (1992). 
77 CLYDE E. JACOBS, THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 153 (1972). 
 78 JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., NARROWING THE NATION’S POWER: THE SUPREME COURT SIDES
WITH THE STATES 3–4 (2002). 
79 JACOBS, supra note 77, at 152. 
80 For additional in-depth commentary on the passage of the Eleventh Amendment and 
the ongoing debate over its doctrinal roots, see Field, supra note 62; Jackson, supra note 71. 
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of state sovereign immunity,81 state waiver of sovereign immunity,82 and 
suits brought under the doctrine of Ex parte Young.83 However, these ex-
ceptions place constraints on Congress’ power to abrogate state sovereign 
immunity84 and on the remedies available.85 Their utility is thus limited 
for plaintiffs who seek to challenge government employees’ allegedly un-
constitutional actions. As a result, many plaintiffs have chosen to side-
step Eleventh Amendment concerns by bringing legal actions against lo-
cal municipalities and other political subdivisions instead, which are not 
rendered immune from suit by the Eleventh Amendment.86 
As plaintiffs have turned to litigation against local and municipal 
governments and entities, local and municipal governments have simul-
taneously evolved and created new boards, authorities, and commissions 
in the name of expanding state services and emphasizing privatization, 
revenue-sharing, and decentralization.87 With ever-expanding and decen-
 
 81 Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 55 (1996). 
 82 Jonathan R. Siegel, Waivers of State Sovereign Immunity and the Ideology of the Elev-
enth Amendment, 52 DUKE L.J. 1167 (2003). 
 83 Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) (holding that plaintiffs may sue a state official in 
their official capacity for prospective injunctive relief in order to end a continuing federal law 
violation). 
 84 See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 59-60 (holding that Congress cannot abrogate states’ 
sovereign immunity pursuant to its powers under Art. I § 8 of the United States Constitution, 
commonly known as the Interstate Commerce Clause, but can use its powers under § 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment). 
 85 See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (allowing plaintiffs to sue state officials in their 
official capacity for prospective injunctive relief); but see Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 74 (re-
fusing to apply the Ex parte Young exception where Congress has “prescribed a detailed re-
medial scheme for the enforcement against a State of a statutorily created right”). 
 86 See, e.g., Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Mt. Healthy City Sch. 
Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977); Lincoln Cty. v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529 (1890). 
Plaintiffs’ ability to sue a municipality for constitutional violations is nevertheless limited be-
cause plaintiffs seeking to hold a municipality liable pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 must clear 
Monell’s heightened threshold of causation. As a result, today’s federal dockets are “replete 
with cases . . . where immunities and the municipal causation requirement conspire to immun-
ize local governments and their officials for conduct that violates the Constitution.” Fred 
Smith, Local Sovereign Immunity, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 409, 464 (2016). 
 87 Jameson B. Bilsborrow, Keeping the Arms in Touch: Taking Political Accountability 
Seriously in the Eleventh Amendment Arm-of-the-State Doctrine, 64 EMORY L.J. 819, 822 
(2015); Linda Lobao, The Rising Importance of Local Government in the United States: Re-
cent Research and Challenges for Sociology, 10 SOC. COMPASS 893, 897 (2016); Rogers, su-
pra note 76, at 1244; see also Keon S. Chi et al., Council of State Governments, Privatization 
in State Government: Trends and Issues, SPECTRUM: J. ST. GOV’T, Fall 2003, at 13, 
https://perma.cc/F968-CKSK; John Joseph Wallis & Wallace E. Oates, Nat’l Bureau of Econ. 
Research, Decentralization in the Public Sector: An Empirical Study of State and Local Gov-
ernment, in FISCAL FEDERALISM: QUANTITATIVE STUDIES 5 (Harvey S. Rosen, ed., University 
of Chicago Press 1988), https://perma.cc/XS22-Y5SU. 
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tralizing local governments, plaintiffs can sue a “limitless” variety of gov-
ernment entities.88 Each time they do, the presiding court must determine 
whether that entity is truly local. If the entity is situated sufficiently 
closely to the state, the court will consider the entity an “arm of the state” 
and thus immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment despite any 
seemingly local character.89 
III. THE ARM-OF-THE-STATE DOCTRINE’S HAPHAZARD EVOLUTION
A. The Supreme Court’s Articulation
The Supreme Court has never issued a definitive framework for how
to conduct the arm-of-the-state inquiry, and three Supreme Court cases 
represent the doctrine’s modern canon.90 In 1977, the Court recognized in 
Mt. Healthy School District Board of Education v. Doyle that Eleventh 
Amendment immunity may apply to lesser government entities that have 
such a close relationship with the state as to be “arm[s] of the state.”91 
The Court considered whether a local public board of education in Ohio 
was entitled to state sovereign immunity in a suit by a district school 
teacher who had been fired.92 The Court balanced factors relevant to de-
termining whether the nature of the governmental entity in question 
makes it more like an arm of the state or more like a municipality or po-
litical subdivision.93 Finding it relevant that Ohio law’s definition of 
“state” did not include local school districts, and that the school board had 
“extensive” financial powers and freedom, the Court ultimately con-
cluded that the district’s status under state law and its ability to generate 
its own revenue outweighed the state’s financial assistance and adminis-
trative involvement.94 The district was “more like a county or city than . . . 
like an arm of the State” and thus not entitled to immunity.95 However, 
88 Bilsborrow, supra note 87, at 821-22. 
89 See Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 280. 
90 In response to the Court’s silence on how to apply the arm-of-the-state analysis con-
sistently, the circuit courts have instead each crafted their own tests, with sometimes contra-
dictory results. See discussion infra Section III.B. 
91 Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 280. 
92 Id. at 281-83. 
93 Id. at 280. 
94 Id. 
95 Id. The Court also noted that the district board received a “significant” amount of 
money from the state of Ohio and some guidance from the state’s board of education, but the 
district board’s financial independence and the exclusion of local school districts from Ohio 
law’s definition of “state” outweighed those considerations. Id. 
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the Court did not explain the relative weight of the factors that it consid-
ered and did not indicate whether courts should consider other factors.96 
Mt. Healthy was not the first time the Court had considered dismiss-
ing a suit on sovereign immunity grounds without the state’s being for-
mally named as a defendant: the Court had long held that, where a state 
is the “real, substantial party in interest,” regardless of the named defend-
ants, the suit should be barred by the Eleventh Amendment.97 But prior 
cases where courts had found the state to be the real party in interest were 
cases in which, if damages were to be awarded, there would be “no doubt” 
that they would come directly from the state treasury.98 Mt. Healthy was 
not such a case, and thus suggested that a lesser government entity might 
share such a close relationship with the state that—so as to protect the 
state’s interests—the entity should be protected from suit by state sover-
eign immunity regardless, even though the state’s treasury may not be 
responsible for any ultimate payment.99 
In the 1979 case of Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional 
Planning Agency, the Court considered whether the Tahoe Regional Plan-
ning Agency (“TRPA”), a bi-state government entity, was entitled to state 
sovereign immunity.100 Private landowners sued the TRPA, a bi-state 
compact between California and Nevada, alleging that the agency had 
adopted a land-use ordinance and engaged in other conduct that destroyed 
the petitioners’ property values.101 While the Ninth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals, from which the petitioners appealed, concluded that TRPA re-
ceived state sovereign immunity because it exercised a “specially aggre-
gated slice of state power,”102 the Supreme Court rejected the circuit’s 
“expansive reading of the Eleventh Amendment.”103 The Court concluded 
that the TRPA could not claim sovereign immunity based on six factors: 
(1) the agency’s characterization in the language of the compact; (2) the 
local government’s role in appointing the agency’s directors; (3) the local, 
 
 96 Héctor G. Bladuell, Twins or Triplets?: Protecting the Eleventh Amendment Through 
a Three-Prong Arm-of-the-State Test, 105 MICH. L. REV. 837, 838-39 (2007); Rogers, supra 
note 76, at 1263. 
 97 Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974) (quoting Ford Motor Co. v. Dep’t of 
Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 464 (1945), overruled on other grounds by Lapides v. Bd. of Regents, 
535 U.S. 613 (2002)). 
 98 Jonathan W. Needle, Note, “Arm of the State” Analysis in Eleventh Amendment Juris-
prudence, 6 REV. LITIG. 193, 207 (1987). 
 99 See Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 280; Bilsborrow, supra note 87, at 826. 
 100 Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391, 393 (1979). 
 101 Id. at 394. 
 102 Id. at 400 (quoting Jacobson v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 566 F.2d 1353, 1359 
(9th Cir. 1977), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l 
Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391 (1979)). 
 103 Id. at 400. 
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non-state source of the agency’s funding; (4) the municipal nature of the 
agency’s function; (5) the state government’s inability to veto the 
agency’s actions; and (6) the state’s lack of financial responsibility for the 
agency’s liabilities and obligations.104 For the first time, the Court also 
examined the state’s intent in creating the entity and the entity’s actual 
operations.105 
The Court acknowledged that, even though some agencies exercising 
state power had previously been allowed to invoke the protections of the 
Eleventh Amendment, those agencies had been found immune from suit 
“in order to protect the state treasury from liability that would have had 
essentially the same practical consequences as a judgment against the 
State itself.”106 In articulating when state sovereign immunity applies to 
governmental entities, the Lake Country Estates Court cited two prior 
cases where immunity was at issue specifically because the state was the 
real party in interest due to the state treasury’s ultimate responsibility for 
any monetary award.107 The Court thus drew a connection between the 
arm-of-the-state and real-party-in-interest doctrines and underscored the 
importance of the state treasury’s direct involvement in both.108 
As parties continued to raise the issue of state sovereign immunity 
for local governmental entities, lower courts struggled to apply the Mt. 
Healthy and Lake Country Estates holdings, and the Second and Third 
Circuits eventually reached different conclusions about the same bistate 
entity, the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey. The Third Cir-
cuit, which concluded that the Port Authority was an arm of the state for 
purposes of Eleventh Amendment immunity, stated that Lake Country Es-
tates did not set out an “exclusive list of factors to be considered” in an 
arm-of-the-state inquiry and conducted an inquiry based on the six Lake 
Country Estates factors as well as Port Authority’s function, power to sue 
and be sued, and immunity from state taxation.109 The Second Circuit, on 
the other hand, found that the Port Authority was not an arm of the state 
and thus not immune from suit.110 While the Second Circuit also used the 
Lake Country Estates factors, the court found that the sixth factor—
104 Id. at 401-02; Bladuell, supra note 96, at 839. 
105 Lake Country Estates, 440 U.S. at 401. 
106 Id. (citing Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974); Ford Motor Co. v. Dep’t of Treas-
ury of Ind., 323 U.S. 459 (1945)). 
107 Id. at 401 n.18. 
 108 Id.; see also Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280 
(1977); Bilsborrow, supra note 87, at 826. 
109 Port Auth. Police Benev. Ass’n, Inc. v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 819 F.2d 413, 417 
(3d Cir. 1987), abrogated by Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30 (1994). 
 110 Feeney v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 873 F.2d 628, 630 (2d Cir. 1989), aff’d, 495 
U.S. 299 (1990). 
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whether the agency’s liability would place the state treasury at risk—was 
“the single most important factor” in determining whether an agency was 
intended to be an arm of the state for Eleventh Amendment purposes.111 
In holding that the Port Authority was not entitled to sovereign immunity, 
the Second Circuit emphasized that, in cases where the state is not the 
defendant, the “exposure of the state treasury” is “critical” to finding 
Eleventh Amendment immunity, and cited to cases which granted such 
immunity under the real-party-in-interest doctrine.112 The Supreme Court 
resolved the split by concluding that the states had waived any immunity 
and did not address the differences in the circuits’ arm-of-the-state anal-
ysis.113 
Four years later, in Hess v. Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corpora-
tion, the Court recognized but did not resolve the circuits’ confusion.114 
Acknowledging that the various “indicators of immunity” had pointed the 
Second and Third Circuits in different directions,115 the Court reempha-
sized that shielding the state’s treasury from liability was the “most salient 
factor” in Eleventh Amendment determinations.116 The Hess Court went 
on to incorporate the Eleventh Amendment’s “twin reasons for being”—
the protection of the state’s treasury and dignity interests—explicitly into 
its arm-of-the-state analysis.117 Pointing to the Port Authority’s financial 
self-sufficiency, the Court ultimately held that there was no concern as to 
state solvency or dignity and upheld the Second Circuit’s finding that the 
Port Authority is not immune from suit.118 
B. Chaos Amongst the Circuits
Although Hess provided lower courts with some guidance as to how
they might apply the arm-of-the-state analysis, the Supreme Court did not 
clarify which factors courts should consider, how heavily they should 
weigh those factors relative to each other, or how the twin reasons are 
involved in the analysis.119 The result has proven nothing less than cha-
otic: every circuit has developed its own version of the arm-of-the-state 
111 Id. at 631. 
112 Id. 
113 Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp. v. Feeney, 495 U.S. 299, 305 (1990). 
114 Hess v. Port. Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30 (1994). 
115 Id. at 47. 
116 Id. 
117 Id. at 47-48. 
118 Id. at 39-40, 47-48, 52. 
119 See Bilsborrow, supra note 87, at 827-29 (questioning whether the twin reasons are a 
second stage of analysis after the reviewing court first considers the various arm-of-the-state 
factors, or whether the twin reasons function as a “prism” through which the factors should 
then be “refracted”). 
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test, which in turn has produced scores of inter- and intra-circuit diver-
gence as to which governmental entities are and are not arms of their re-
spective states.120 Some circuits have attempted to revise their arm-of-the-
state analyses in light of Hess,121 while others have maintained that their 
analyses are consistent with Hess’ approach.122 
Each federal circuit uses between two and seven factors to determine 
whether a governmental entity is an arm of the state that receives Eleventh 
Amendment immunity.123 The factors fall into five broad categories: (1) 
whether the entity performs local or state functions; (2) the degree of state 
political and administrative control over the entity; (3) the entity’s powers 
and financial autonomy from the state; (4) the entity’s characterization by 
state law; and (5) whether the state treasury would ultimately pay any 
judgments against the entity.124 The inquiry is ultimately one into the en-
tity’s status under the Eleventh Amendment, but because the criteria are 
so difficult to define, circuits apply the arm-of-the-state analysis on a fact-
intensive, case-by-case basis.125 
120 See infra notes 129-48. 
 121 E.g., Irizarry-Mora v. Univ. of P.R., 647 F.3d 9, 12 (1st Cir. 2011) (describing the First 
Circuit’s decision to “reformulate [its] analysis as a two-part inquiry whose steps reflect[] the 
Eleventh Amendment’s twin concerns for the States’ dignity and their financial solvency” 
raised in Hess). Muddying the waters even further, this revision is in name only; the substance 
of the court’s analysis remains the same. Id. (“[T]he ‘reshaping’ of our law did not represent 
an actual change in the substance of the analysis.”). 
122 E.g., P.R. Ports Auth. v. Fed. Mar. Comm’n, 531 F.3d 868, 874 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (read-
ing Hess as “confirm[ing] that we must apply the three-factor arm-of-the-state test and look 
to state intent, state control, and overall effects on the state treasury.”); Ernst v. Rising, 427 
F.3d 351, 359 (6th Cir. 2005) (describing the Sixth Circuit’s four-factor based approach as
“similar” to that of the Supreme Court).
123 For an in-depth description of each circuit’s arm-of-the-state test and examples of its 
application, see 17A JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 123.23[4] (3d 
ed. 2013). 
124 Rogers, supra note 76, at 1269. 
125 Id. at 1272. 
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The First Circuit uses a two-part test that requires the analysis of 
seven additional factors.126 The Second Circuit has two tests: one consid-
ers six factors,127 the other two,128 and both emphasize the importance of 
protecting the state’s treasury.129 The Third Circuit holds that, in some 
cases, whether an entity is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity can 
be determined summarily from the statutes establishing and governing the 
entity.130 On the other hand, where evidence beyond statutory language is 
required, the Third Circuit uses a three-factor test that gives each factor 
equal weight,131 although the Third Circuit has historically ascribed the 
 
 126 Fresenius Med. Care Cardiovascular Res., Inc. v. P.R. & Caribbean Cardiovascular Ctr. 
Corp., 322 F.3d 56, 68 (1st Cir. 2003). In administering this test, First Circuit courts ask 
whether the state has structured the entity to share Eleventh Amendment immunity and 
whether there is a risk that money damages will be paid from the state treasury should the 
entity be found liable. To answer those two questions, First Circuit courts consider up to seven 
factors, including: (1) whether the agency has the financial power to satisfy judgments without 
involving the state; (2) whether the agency’s function is governmental or proprietary; (3) 
whether the agency is separately incorporated; (4) how much control the state exerts over the 
agency; (5) whether the agency can sue, be sued, and enter contracts; (6) whether the agency’s 
property is subject to state taxes; and (7) whether the state has immunized itself from liability 
for the agency’s acts. Id. at 62 n.6 (quoting Metcalf & Eddy, Inc. v. P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer 
Auth., 991 F.2d 935, 939-40 (1st Cir. 1993)). 
 127 Mancuso v. N.Y. State Thruway Auth., 86 F.3d 289, 293 (2d Cir. 1996). Under this 
test, Second Circuit courts first consider six factors: “(1) how the entity is referred to in the 
documents that created it; (2) how the governing members of the entity are appointed; (3) how 
the entity is funded; (4) whether the entity’s function is traditionally one of local or state gov-
ernment; (5) whether the state has a veto power over the entity’s actions; and (6) whether the 
entity’s obligations are binding upon the state.” Id. If those six factors “point in different di-
rections,” circuit courts then consider Hess’ twin rationales for the Eleventh Amendment and 
ask whether allowing the entity to be sued in federal court will threaten the integrity of the 
state or expose the state treasury to risk. Id. 
 128 Clissuras v. City Univ. of N.Y., 359 F.3d 79, 82 (2d Cir. 2004), supplemented, 90 F. 
App’x 566 (2d Cir. 2004). Under this test, Second Circuit courts consider (1) whether a judg-
ment against the entity would render the state responsible for paying the damages, and (2) the 
extent of the state’s control over the entity. Id. 
 129 Mansuco, 86 F.3d at 293; Clissuras, 359 F.3d at 82. The Second Circuit’s use of two 
distinct arm-of-the-state tests is perhaps due to Pikulin v. City University of New York, 176 
F.3d 598 (2d Cir. 1999), which specifically discussed the status of the City University of New 
York (“CUNY”) as an arm of the state. Pikulin was based in turn on a series of district court 
opinions issued before Mancuso that had discussed CUNY’s arm-of-the-state status. See, e.g., 
Burrell v. City Univ. of N.Y., 995 F. Supp. 398, 410–11 (S.D.N.Y. 1998); Minetos v. City 
Univ. of N.Y., 875 F. Supp. 1046, 1053 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); Moche v. City Univ. of N.Y., 781 
F. Supp. 160, 165 (E.D.N.Y. 1992), aff’d without opinion, 999 F.2d 538 (2d Cir. 1993); Scelsa 
v. City Univ. of N.Y., 806 F. Supp. 1126, 1137 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); Silver v. City Univ. of N.Y., 
767 F. Supp. 494, 499 (S.D.N.Y.), aff’d on other grounds, 947 F.2d 1021 (2d Cir. 1991); Ritzie 
v. City Univ. of N.Y., 703 F. Supp. 271, 276–77 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). 
 130 Betts v. New Castle Youth Dev. Ctr., 621 F.3d 249, 254 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 131 Benn v. First Judicial Dist. of Pa., 426 F.3d 233, 239-40 (3d Cir. 2005). The three 
factors that the Third Circuit considers are: (1) whether any money damages that result from 
the entity being held liable will come from the state treasury; (2) the agency’s status under 
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most importance to whether the state treasury would pay any damages 
arising from the entity’s liability.132 The Fourth Circuit considers four 
non-exclusive factors,133 the most important one being the state treasury’s 
potential responsibility.134 The Fifth Circuit’s test uses six factors,135 with 
the source of an entity’s funding being the most important.136 The Sixth 
Circuit uses four factors and gives the most weight to the state’s potential 
liability.137 The Seventh Circuit’s test has two factors, one of which has 
five subparts, with financial autonomy the more important factor.138 The 
Eighth Circuit uses a two-factor test, the ultimate question being whether 
state law; and (3) the agency’s degree of autonomy. Fitchik v. N.J. Transit Rail Operations, 
Inc., 873 F.2d 655, 659 (3d Cir. 1989). 
132 Fitchik, 873 F.2d at 659-62. 
 133 S.C. Dep’t of Disabilities & Special Needs v. Hoover Universal, Inc., 535 F.3d 300, 
303 (4th Cir. 2008). The Fourth Circuit considers: (1) whether any judgment against the entity 
will be paid by or inure to the benefit of the state; (2) the degree of autonomy exercised by the 
entity; (3) whether the entity is involved with local or state concerns; and (4) how the entity is 
treated under state law. Id. 
134 Hutto v. S.C. Ret. Sys., 773 F.3d 536, 543 (4th Cir. 2014). 
135 Providence Behavioral Health v. Grant Rd. Pub. Util. Dist., 902 F.3d 448, 456 (5th Cir. 
2018). The six factors are: (1) whether state statutes and case law view the agency as an arm 
of the state; (2) the source of the entity’s funding; (3) the entity’s degree of local autonomy; 
(4) whether the entity is concerned with local or statewide problems; (5) whether the entity
can sue and be sued in its own name; and (6) whether the entity has the right to hold and use
property. Id.
136 Delahoussaye v. City of New Iberia, 937 F.2d 144, 147-48 (5th Cir. 1991). 
 137 Ernst v. Rising, 427 F.3d 351, 359 (6th Cir. 2005). Sixth Circuit courts consider: (1) 
the state’s potential liability for a judgment against the entity; (2) the language that state stat-
utes and state courts use to refer to the entity and the degree of state control over the entity; 
(3) whether state or local officials appointed the entity’s administrative officers; and (4)
whether the entity’s functions are that of state or local government. Id.
138 Tucker v. Williams, 682 F.3d 654, 659 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing Kashani v. Purdue Univ., 
813 F.2d 843, 845–47 (7th Cir.1987)). The Seventh Circuit considers the entity’s financial 
autonomy and its general legal status; in analyzing the entity’s financial autonomy, Seventh 
Circuit courts evaluate “the extent of state funding, the state’s oversight and control of the 
entity’s fiscal affairs, the entity’s ability to raise funds independently, whether the state taxes 
the entity, and whether a judgment against the entity would result in the state increasing its 
appropriations to the entity.” 
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the state is the real party in interest.139 The Ninth Circuit uses five fac-
tors,140 with the state’s potential liability the most important.141 The Tenth 
Circuit uses a four-factor test.142 The Eleventh Circuit analyzes four fac-
tors143 in light of the defendant’s function when taking the challenged ac-
tion.144 Finally, the D.C. Circuit uses a three-factor test.145 All of the cir-
cuits consider the entity’s source of funding or financial independence in 
some way, but no two circuits use the same test.146 
In deciding whether to grant Eleventh Amendment immunity to gov-
ernmental entities, the circuits use nebulous factors that they do not weigh 
in any consistent manner, which creates unpredictable and occasionally 
conflicting results.147 This raises fundamental concerns for litigants who 
seek to challenge practices, like fines and fees, of what would seem at 
first blush to be obviously municipal bodies, like municipal courts. 
 
 139 Pub. Sch. Ret. Sys. of Mo. v. State St. Bank & Tr. Co., 640 F.3d 821, 827 (8th Cir. 
2011). Eighth Circuit courts examine the degree of an entity’s independence from the state 
and whether a money judgment would implicate the state treasury. Id. But see United States 
ex rel. Fields v. Bi-State Dev. Agency of Mo.-Ill. Metro. Dist., 872 F.3d 872, 877 (8th Cir. 
2017) (applying a six-factor test). 
 140 Sato v. Orange Cty. Dep’t of Educ., 861 F.3d 923, 928-29 (9th Cir. 2017). Ninth Circuit 
courts consider (1) whether a money judgment against the entity would be satisfied by state 
funds; (2) whether the entity performs central government functions; (3) whether the entity 
may sue or be sued; (4) whether the entity can take property in its own name or only the name 
of the state; and (5) the entity’s corporate status. 
 141 Doe v. Lawrence Livermore Nat. Lab., 131 F.3d 836, 839 (9th Cir. 1997). 
 142 Steadfast Ins. Co. v. Agric. Ins. Co., 507 F.3d 1250, 1253 (10th Cir. 2007). Tenth Cir-
cuit courts analyze: (1) state law’s characterization of the entity; (2) the entity’s autonomy 
under state law and the degree of control the state exercises over the entity; (3) the entity’s 
state funding and ability to issue bonds or levy taxes on its own behalf; and (4) whether the 
entity in question is concerned primarily with local or state affairs. But see Watson v. Univ. 
of Utah Med. Ctr., 75 F.3d 569, 574-75 (10th Cir. 1996) (describing a two-part arm-of-the-
state analysis). 
 143 Ross v. Jefferson Cty. Dep’t of Health, 701 F.3d 655, 660 (11th Cir. 2012) (quoting 
Manders v. Lee, 338 F.3d 1304, 1309 (11th Cir. 2003)). Eleventh Circuit courts consider: (1) 
how state law defines the entity; (2) the state’s degree of control over the entity; (3) the source 
of the entity’s funds; and (4) who is responsible for judgments against the entity. 
 144 Manders v. Lee, 338 F.3d 1304, 1308 (11th Cir. 2003). 
 145 P.R. Ports Auth. v. Fed. Mar. Comm’n, 531 F.3d 868, 873 (D.C. Cir. 2008). D.C. Cir-
cuit courts consider: (1) the state’s intent as to the entity’s status, including the functions it 
performs; (2) the state’s control over the entity; and (3) the entity’s overall effects on the state 
treasury. 
 146 See supra notes 126-45. 
 147 See discussion supra Section III.A; Rogers, supra note 76, at 1243-44. 
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IV. MUNICIPAL COURTS, SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY, AND THE NEED FOR AN
ARM-OF-THE-STATE TEST CONSISTENT WITH THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT
A. Municipal Courts Are More “Municipal” Than “Court”
Municipal courts illustrate how the expansion of local governments’
and their simultaneous privatization and decentralization can lead to a 
governmental entity that both makes hyperlocal decisions and is claimed 
to be an arm of the state by municipalities defending against debtors’ 
prison lawsuits.148 The National Center for State Courts defines municipal 
courts as stand-alone trial courts with limited jurisdiction that are funded 
“largely by a local unit of government.”149 In many states, these courts 
are created by towns or cities150 and receive exclusively local funding.151 
As a result, municipal courts are frequently entangled with other munici-
pal branches of government: for instance, in Missouri, municipal court 
employees often work for both the court and for their city’s executive 
office, and many report to city officials working in the finance depart-
ment.152 Court administrators and clerks who report to city finance direc-
tors or officials have reported that their “city uses the court for one of their 
148 See sources cited supra notes 52, 54-55, 58, 87. 
 149 Municipal Courts Resource Guide, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, 
https://perma.cc/8PVV-PC4E (last visited Nov. 21, 2019). 
150 See, e.g., About the Nevada Judiciary, SUPREME COURT OF NEV., 
https://perma.cc/LY69-B6NV (last visited May 10, 2019) (“Each of these [municipal] courts 
is funded by the city . . . .”); An Overview of the Utah Justice Courts, UTAH COURTS,
https://perma.cc/8SYD-AF8K (last visited May 10, 2019) (“Justice Courts are established by 
counties and municipalities . . . .”); Courts of Limited Jurisdiction, WASH. COURTS, 
https://perma.cc/YM56-DJKJ (last visited May 10, 2019) (“Municipal courts are those created 
by cities and towns.”); Indiana Trial Courts: Types of Courts, IND. JUDICIAL BRANCH, 
https://perma.cc/DQF7-UGM9 (last visited May 10, 2019) (“City and town courts may be 
created by local ordinance (local law).”); Municipal Court, S.C. JUDICIAL BRANCH, 
https://perma.cc/P6ET-DHWQ (last visited May 10, 2019) (“The council of each municipality 
may establish, by ordinance, a municipal court to hear and determine all cases within its juris-
diction.”); Municipal Courts, N.D. COURTS, https://perma.cc/LMB7-A9SM (last visited May 
10, 2019) (“Each municipality under 5,000 in population has the option of deciding whether 
or not to have a municipal court.”); Municipal Courts, WIS. COURT SYSTEM, 
https://perma.cc/82XJ-PGGW (last visited May 10, 2019) (directing municipalities interested 
in creating a municipal court towards a set of resources); The Supreme Court of Georgia His-
tory, Municipal Courts, SUPREME COURT OF GA., https://perma.cc/NB84-27W5 (last visited 
Nov. 21, 2019) (“Cities and towns in Georgia establish municipal courts . . . .”). 
 151 See sources cited supra note 150; State Court Structure Charts, COURT STATISTICS
PROJECT, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, https://perma.cc/3T96-YX9E (last visited May 10, 
2019) (offering summaries of all fifty states’ courts’ structure, jurisdiction, and funding 
sources). 
 152 Lawrence G. Myers, Judicial Independence in the Municipal Court: Preliminary Ob-
servations from Missouri, 41 CT. REV. 26, 27 (2004), https://perma.cc/4R5U-N8FP. 
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main sources of income.”153 Locally funded, locally established, and lo-
cally staffed, municipal courts—which take on tens of millions of cases a 
year and are the only way that most residents come into contact with the 
judicial system154—are thus quintessentially local entities which in turn 
are used to raise revenue for their cities and towns.155 
Where courts have focused their arm-of-the-state inquiry on a mu-
nicipal court’s funding or level of local control—two Lake Country fac-
tors that circuits tend to emphasize in their arm-of-the-state analyses—
municipal courts have not received Eleventh Amendment immunity from 
suit.156 Moreover, while municipal courts are technically part of their 
state’s judicial system,157 they do not share the same jurisdictional or 
practical characteristics as other state courts.158 State judicial systems are 
comprised of trial courts, mid-level appellate courts, and a highest court, 
typically the Supreme Court or Court of Appeals.159 Municipal courts sit 
below all of these courts and are so specific to their town or city that even 
the National Center for State Courts does not mention them in its sum-
mary of state court systems.160 It is thus disingenuous to paint municipal 
courts as identical to state trial or appellate courts, which have in the past 
been held to be arms of the state.161 
 
 153 Id. at 28. 
 154 See, e.g., Janet G. Cornell, Limited-Jurisdiction Courts: Challenges, Opportunities, 
and Strategies for Action, in FUTURE TRENDS IN STATE COURTS 67, 69 (2012) 
https://perma.cc/G76S-85UY (discussing limited jurisdiction courts’ high case volume and 
interaction with residents); The Municipal Courts of New Jersey, N.J. COURTS, 
https://perma.cc/3R8Z-S9YV (last visited May 10, 2019) (“It is through the Municipal Courts 
that most citizens in the State come into contact with the judicial system . . . .”). 
 155 See discussion supra Section I.A. 
 156 Kirkland v. DiLeo, No. 12-cv-1196 (KM), 2013 WL 1651814, at *5-6 (D.N.J. Apr. 15, 
2013), aff’d, 581 F. App’x 111 (3d Cir. 2014); In re Brown, 244 B.R. 62, 69 (Bankr. D.N.J. 
2000). 
 157 See Municipal Courts Resource Guide, supra note 149. 
 158 See sources cited supra notes 150-51, 154. 
 159 Comparing Federal & State Courts, U.S. COURTS, https://perma.cc/JGA2-PR8B (last 
visited May 10, 2019). 
 160 National Center for State Courts, The Who, What, When, Where and How of State 
Courts, VIMEO (Nov. 8, 2018, 10:40 AM), https://vimeo.com/299681452. 
 161 E.g., Greater L.A. Council on Deafness, Inc. v. Zolin, 812 F.2d 1103 (9th Cir. 1987), 
superseded by statute on other grounds, as recognized in Alexis v. County of Los Angeles, 
698 F. App’x 345, 346 (9th Cir. 2017); Harris v. Mo. Ct. of App., 787 F.2d 427, 429 (8th Cir. 
1986); Dolan v. City of Ann Arbor, 666 F. Supp. 2d 754, 764-65 (E.D. Mich. 2009), aff’d, 
407 F. App’x 45 (6th Cir. 2011); Jones v. Winters, No. 4:09CV00019 BSM, 2009 WL 764539, 
at *3 (E.D. Ark. Mar. 19, 2009); NAACP v. State of California, 511 F. Supp. 1244, 1257-58 
(E.D. Cal. 1981), aff’d, 711 F.2d 121 (9th Cir. 1983). Notably, many of these circuit-level 
opinions, which courts later cite when granting state trial courts sovereign immunity, were 
decided before Hess and thus do not incorporate the Supreme Court’s most recent guidance 
on the arm-of-the-state analysis’ overarching intent. 
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In the context of debtors’ prison litigation, municipal courts should 
not receive Eleventh Amendment immunity not only because they are un-
like the rest of their state’s judicial system but also because they are not 
acting on that system’s behalf.162 When court employees like clerks and 
judges—who frequently report to their city’s executive branch—charge 
defendants fines and fees in order to generate municipal revenue,163 the 
municipal court acts not as part of the state judicial system but as part of 
and on behalf of its municipality.164 While the Supreme Court has on one 
occasion suggested in dicta that, where local governments provide judi-
cial services, they are “typically” treated as arms of the state for Eleventh 
Amendment purposes,165 the Court has not clarified whether municipal 
courts are included in that definition. 
Given that municipal courts’ practice of charging fines and fees is 
driven by municipal revenue generation, not by the “fair administration 
of justice,”166 the court’s function seems more municipal than judicial. 
Thus, municipal courts charging fines and fees act as part of the munici-
pality they sit in—and municipalities are not protected from suit by the 
Eleventh Amendment.167 But the confused state of the arm-of-the-state 
doctrine means that litigants cannot predict when courts will recognize 
this reality. 
B. The Arm-of-the-State Analysis Should Reflect the Eleventh 
Amendment’s Intent 
Given the Supreme Court’s ambiguous guidance on the arm-of-the-
state analysis, federal circuits’ divergent approaches, and the ever-ex-
panding role of local government, the arm-of-the-state doctrine should be 
 
 162 See sources cited supra notes 150-53. 
 163 See sources cited supra notes 151-53, 154; discussion supra Section I.A. 
 164 See supra notes 16, 24. 
 165 Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 527 n.16 (2004) (“[J]udicial services [are] an area in 
which local governments are typically treated as ‘arm[s] of the State’ for Eleventh Amendment 
purposes . . . .”) (citing Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280 (1977)). 
Notably, none of the cases that were cited to support the Supreme Court’s dictum involved 
municipally funded municipal courts. 
 166 FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 24, at 15. When municipal court employees impose 
fines and fees with the express purpose of increasing municipal revenue—and do so in close 
concert with non-judicial branches of the local government—they participate in a scheme that 
has no underlying judicial rationale. “The purpose of courts is to be a forum for the fair and 
just resolution of disputes, and in doing so to preserve the rule of law and protect individual 
rights and liberties.” NAT’L TASK FORCE ON FINES, FEES, AND BAIL PRACTICES, NAT’L CTR. FOR 
STATE COURTS, PRINCIPLES ON FINES, FEES, AND BAIL PRACTICES 2 (2018), 
https://perma.cc/H6S3-9E2L. The use of debtors’ prison practices thus undermines the court 
system’s judicial function for pecuniary gain. See also sources cited supra notes 17, 31, 33. 
 167 See sources cited supra note 86. 
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refocused to more fully embody the Supreme Court’s twin rationales for 
sovereign immunity168 and the historical basis for the Eleventh Amend-
ment.169 
One possibility, as suggested in an article which has been cited by 
the Supreme Court and numerous federal courts,170 is confining the test 
to two inquiries that promote structural federalism171: (1) how state law 
defines the governmental entity; and (2) whether the governmental entity 
is empowered to generate its own revenue.172 Author Alex E. Rogers de-
scribes the threshold question that courts should address as whether the 
state enabling act that created the entity expresses—in unmistakably clear 
language—that the state intends to designate the entity as an arm of the 
state.173 This approach embodies the Supreme Court’s reliance in both Mt. 
Healthy and Lake Country Estates on the state law’s explicit language 
concerning the entity in question.174 If the state statute does not clearly 
articulate an intent to designate the entity as an arm of the state, the court 
should consider whether the entity has the independent power to raise its 
own revenue.175 Only those entities that are not empowered to generate 
funds through means such as “the issuance of debt” should be granted 
Eleventh Amendment immunity.176 This two-part analysis is consistent 
 
 168 Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 47-48 (1994). 
 169 See Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 322-23 (1934). 
 170 E.g., Hess, 513 U.S. at 59; P.R. Ports Auth. v. Fed. Mar. Comm’n, 531 F.3d 868, 879 
(D.C. Cir. 2008); Beentjes v. Placer Cty. Air Pollution Control Dist., 397 F.3d 775, 780 (9th 
Cir. 2005); Fresenius Med. Care Cardiovascular Res., Inc. v. P.R. & Caribbean Cardiovascular 
Ctr. Corp., 322 F.3d 56, 62 n.5 (1st Cir. 2003); Gray v. Laws, 51 F.3d 426, 432 n.3 (4th Cir. 
1995). 
 171 For an in-depth discussion of structural federalism, a theory fundamental to the rela-
tionship between the state and federal governments, see Aziz Z. Huq, The Negotiated Struc-
tural Constitution, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1595 (2014); Erin Ryan, Negotiating Federalism and 
the Structural Constitution: Navigating the Separation of Powers Both Vertically and Hori-
zontally, 115 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 4 (2015); Keith E. Whittington, Dismantling the Mod-
ern State? The Changing Structural Foundations of Federalism, 25 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 
483 (1998). 
 172 Rogers, supra note 76, at 1296. The author notes that courts have blended multiple 
facets of the financial relationship between the entity and the state, and that the question of 
whether the state treasury will ultimately be held liable is frequently unresolvable because 
enabling statutes do not always mandate that the state satisfy the entity’s judgment. Id. at 
1294-95. 
 173 Id. at 1288-91. This heightened level of inquiry into the state’s law reflects the “clear 
statement” requirement for congressional abrogation and state waiver of Eleventh Amendment 
immunity. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 55 (1996); Port Auth. Trans-Hudson 
Corp. v. Feeney, 495 U.S. 299, 305-06 (1990); Siegel, supra note 82. 
 174 See Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391, 401-02 
(1979); Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280 (1977). 
 175 Rogers, supra note 76, at 1305. 
 176 Id. 
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with the Supreme Court’s interpretation of at least part of the Eleventh 
Amendment’s intent as protecting the state treasury from liability for 
judgments against a non-state governmental entity.177 If the entity cannot 
generate its own funding and relies entirely on state funding, any judg-
ment will logically come from the state treasury, and the Eleventh 
Amendment will protect the entity from suit, but if the entity both gener-
ates its own revenue and receives state funding, courts will have to engage 
in a fact-based inquiry to determine the extent of the entity’s ability to 
generate its own revenue.178 However, because the proposed analysis fo-
cuses solely on the entity’s financial autonomy, rather than the specula-
tive impact of a judgment on the state’s treasury or future funding for the 
entity, courts will not be forced to conduct the same kind of intensive 
analysis that they currently undertake.179 
Other commentators have proposed: focusing on the state’s intent to 
provide the entity with immunity, the state’s legal and practical liability 
for the judgment, and whether the entity serves a state or local function;180 
reframing the inquiry to be one about political accountability, specifically 
considering whether the state’s interests sufficiently coincide with the en-
tity’s affairs;181 and asking instead only whether the basis of jurisdiction 
is diversity of citizenship or federal question.182 While these approaches 
rightfully attempt to make sense of the arm-of-the-state doctrine’s ambi-
guity, they do not accomplish the necessary task of both simplifying 
courts’ analyses and integrating the rationales for Eleventh Amendment 
immunity. 
Because they do not resolve the arm-of-the-state doctrine’s ambigu-
ity and do not explicitly address funding, these proposals will engender 
either continued inter-circuit divergence or a move away from the original 
purposes of the Eleventh Amendment—or both. The two-factor approach 
more accurately addresses the shortcomings of the arm-of-the-state doc-
trine in its current form. 
Based on the twin reasons for the Eleventh Amendment, protecting 
the state’s treasury and “dignity,”183 a governmental entity’s financial in-
dependence and status under state law are appropriately paramount con-
 
 177 Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 47-48 (1994). 
 178 Rogers, supra note 76, at 1308. 
 179 Id. 
 180 Bladuell, supra note 96, at 852-53. 
 181 Bilsborrow, supra note 87, at 849. 
 182 Anthony J. Harwood, A Narrow Eleventh Amendment Immunity for Political Subdivi-
sions: Reconciling the Arm of the State Doctrine with Federalism Principles, 55 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 101, 120 (1986). 
 183 Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 47-48 (1994). 
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siderations in the arm-of-the-state analysis: in the age of local govern-
ment,184 it has never been more important that municipalities and munic-
ipal courts not be able to hide behind the cloak of state sovereign immun-
ity. 
CONCLUSION 
The rise of modern-day debtors’ prison practices and debtors’ prison 
litigation reveal the need for renewed attention to the arm-of-the-state 
doctrine’s disarray. The Supreme Court’s limited precedent has not pro-
vided sufficient guidance for the federal circuits, which have in turn pro-
duced divergent arm-of-the-state analyses with inconsistent results. Based 
on the doctrine in its current form, municipal courts should not be immune 
from debtors’ prison suits—but litigants cannot predict that courts will 
come to that conclusion. There is thus a pronounced need for a more co-
herent arm-of-the-state test that reflects the Eleventh Amendment’s in-
tent. Courts would be wise to center two factors in their analysis: the en-
tity’s status under state law and the entity’s financial independence. Under 
this more precise articulation of the arm-of-the-state inquiry, it becomes 
clear that municipal courts which charge defendants fines and fees in or-
der to generate revenue for themselves and for the municipality in which 
they sit should not be immune from suit. As locally established, locally 
staffed, and locally and self-funded entities, municipal courts must be 
held liable for their debtors’ prison schemes. 
 
 184 Lobao, supra note 87, at 897. 
